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claims for cargo loss or damage be litigated in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. In January 2000, when the steel coils were subsequently loaded onto SK's vessel, the MN 
Faros, in Taiwan, SK issued twelve bills of lading to Yieh Loong; the latter was designated the shipper, 
and the "consignee" was designated "To Order," rendering the bills negotiable. The reverse of each bill 
of lading contained a forum selection clause stipulating that any claim concerning goods carried under 
the Bills would be brought before the Seoul District Court in South Korea. 
Asoma claims that, at some point after Yieh Loong delivered the steel onto the MN Faros in 
Taiwan, and before the March 2000 delivery to the United States, the coils were damaged by seawater. 
Asoma brought suit against SK in the Southern District of New York, seeking in excess of $140,000 in 
damages. Defendants moved to dismiss by reason of the South Korea forum selection clause in the bills 
of lading. After Asoma amended its complaint to assert its claims under the contract of charter, and to 
rely on that contract's forum selection clause, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings based 
on the South Korea forum selection clause. The district court ultimately dismissed the Amended 
Complaint, ruling that the controlling contracts of carriage were the bills of lading issued by SK to Yieh 
Loong. The district court concluded that the contract of charter between SK Shipping and Asoma was 
irrelevant, because the bills of lading were the contract of carriage. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and legal 
conclusions de novo. Evolution Online Sys. , Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV, 145 F.3d 505, 508 
(2d Cir. 1998). The Court noted that, as between a shipowner and the charterer, a bill of lading never 
affects the terms of a contract of charter; bills of lading operate as receipts for goods, and also as 
documents of title for the purpose of passing possession of the goods, but they do not operate as new 
contracts, or as modifying the contract of charter. The Fri, 154 F. 333, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1907). The Court 
concluded that the district court should have enforced the New York forum selection clause of the 
contract of charter, because SK Shipping entered into a contract with MUR London and its "nominee," 
Asoma, to litigate cargo claims brought under the contract in the Southern District of New York. SK 
Shipping could not escape that contractual commitment by issuing bills of lading containing a different 
forum selection clause to the shipper of the cargo. A carrier which entered into a contract of charter 
could not unilaterally alter the terms of its contract by issuing bills of lading containing inconsistent 
terms upon its receipt of the cargo. 
Because Asoma was the charterer under a contract of charter made with SK as owner, Asoma 
was entitled to bring its claim for cargo damage in the Southern District of New York. The Court noted 
that the fact that the carrier's obligations would have been governed by a different contract had suit been 
brought under the bills of lading by a stranger to the contract of charter did not alter the fact that SK had 
agreed in the charter contract to be bound by its terms in disputes with the charterer. 
Accordingly the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of Asoma' s suit against 
SK Shipping. 
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COURT OF APPEALS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCES DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN EXXON VALDEZ CASE 
Defendant oil company and its related shipping company sought review from a decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska, which imposed $4.5 billion in punitive 
damages after defendants' negligence caused the oil tanker Exxon Valdez to run aground in 
Alaskan waters, resulting in a large oil spill, in 1989. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit had 
remanded the district court's decision as to punitive damages on two previous occasions. The 
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district court had found defendants liable for $513.1 million in harm, and a jury had assessed $5 
billion in punitive damages. After two appeals of the punitive damage award, the district court 
instituted punitive damages of $4.5 billion. On the third appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated that 
award and ordered a remittitur of $2 billion, reducing the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion. 
The Court noted that although defendants' conduct was knowing and reckless, it was not 
intentionally malicious. Thus, a punitive damages award that corresponded with the highest 
degree of reprehensibility did not comport with due process, inasmuch as defendants' conduct fell 
in the middle of the fault continuum. The court concluded that a punitive damages-to-harm ratio 
of no more than 5 to 1 was proper. 
Baker v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Exxon Valdez) 
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 31503 
(Filed December 22, 2006) 
This Court of Appeals opinion as to the issue of punitive damages arose out of the infamous 
1989 grounding of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince William Sound, which resulted in the 
spillage of crude oil into the surrounding waters. At the outset, the Court of Appeals noted that Exxon 
had already been punished in settled, separate litigation for dirtying the Sound, and that the plaintiffs' 
punitive damages case was saved from preemption and res judicata because their award vindicated only 
private economic and quasi-economic interests, not the public interest in punishing harm to the 
environment. 
The Court also noted that resolution of the issue of punitive damages had been delayed since 
1991 because of intervening Supreme Court decisions outlining the relationship of punitive damages to 
the principles of constitutional due process, which had caused the Court of Appeals to remand the matter 
twice to the district court for reconsideration of punitive damages in light of the evolving Supreme Court 
law. 
The Court of Appeals thus re-analyzed the punitive damages award, guided by four recent 
United States Supreme Court cases -- Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); 
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. , 509 U.S. 443 (1993); BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); and State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003). 
In BMW v. Gore, the Supreme Court delineated three factors that a court should consider in 
reviewing a jury's award of punitive damages: 1) the "reprehensibility" of the conduct (an award should 
reflect "the enormity" of the offense); 2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm to the 
plaintiffs flowing from the conduct, and the punitive damages assessed by the jury [a measure of the 
ratio between the punitive award and the amount of harm inflicted on the plaintiff(s)]; and 3) the 
difference between the punitives and the civil and criminal penalties authorized by the state for that 
conduct (to be used by reviewing courts in according substantial deference to legislative judgments 
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue). 
In State Farm, the Supreme Court again emphasized that the "most important indicium" of a 
punitive damages award's reasonableness was the relative reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 
However, State Farm significantly sharpened the reprehensibility analysis by instructing courts to 
further weigh five specific considerations: 1) whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to 
economic; 2) whether the conduct causing the plaintiffs harm showed "indifference to or a reckless 
disregard of the health or safety of others:" 3) whether the "target of the conduct" was financially 
vulnerable; 4) whether the defendant's conduct involved repeated actions as opposed to an isolated 
incident; and 5) whether the harm caused was the result of "intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or 
mere accident." The Supreme Court did not rank these factors; it did, however, explain that the presence 
5 
of only one factor weighing in a plaintiffs favor might not be sufficient to support a punitive damages 
award, and that the absence of all five factors would make any such award "suspect." 
Taking BMW v. Gore and State Farm into account, the Court of Appeals engaged in a lengthy 
and thorough analysis of the punitive damages review factors gleaned from those cases as they applied 
to the facts of this case. In assessing the reprehensibility of Exxon's misconduct, the Court of Appeals 
held that although Exxon had exhibited reckless misconduct in placing a known, relapsed alcoholic in 
command of a supertanker loaded with millions of barrels of oil, the misconduct did not warrant 
sanctions at the highest range allowable under the due process analysis. In addition, mitigating facts -­
including Exxon's prompt action to clean up the oil and to compensate the plaintiffs for economic losses 
-- worked to mollify, in the Court's view, the reprehensibility of Exxon's original misconduct in 
economic terms. Relying on State Farm, the Court held that the district court's imposition of punitive 
damages of $ 4.5 billion represented damages at the highest range, and was not warranted. The Court 
added that although a one-to-one punitives to harm ratio marked the upper limit in State Farm, the 
conduct at issue in this case was far more egregious and justified a considerably higher ratio; thus a five­
to-one punitives to harm ratio was appropriate. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the matter with 
instructions that the district court further reduce the punitive damages award to the amount of $ 2.5 
billion. In a terse final sentence, the Court stated: "It is time for this protracted litigation to end." 
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COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINS DISTRICT COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF EQUAL 
LIABILITY IN CASE ARISING FROM A COLLISION OF A T  ANKER AND A DREDGE 
VESSEL 
The Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of equal fault in a 
collision between two vessels in a channel. While acknowledging that findings of equal fault were 
rare in court cases, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had properly identified a 
variety of negligent acts by both parties which supported its finding of equal fault. 
Stolt Achievement, Ltd., v. Dredge B.E. Lindholm 
United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
447 F.3d 360 
(Decided April 19, 2006) 
Plaintiff ship owner appealed from a ruling of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas, complaining of various errors in the district court's resolution of its claims against 
Defendants, a dredge and its owner, in Plaintiffs action arising from the collision of its tanker and the 
dredge. 
On October 21, 2002 a collision occurred between the chemical tanker STOLT 
ACHIEVEMENT ("tanker") and the dredge boat LINDHOLM ("dredge"). The tanker was headed 
inbound down the center of the Houston Shipping Channel. The dredge was traveling outbound, hugging 
the starboard side of the channel. All vessels in the Channel are required to navigate under the Uniform 
Inland Navigational Rules. As the vessels approached, the tanker contacted the dredge and the vessels 
agreed to a customary port-to-port, "one-whistle" passing. Approximately two minutes after the initial 
contact, the captain of the dredge lost control of the vessel, causing it to sheer port toward the tanker. 
The tanker captain attempted to contact the dredge captain; when reached on the third call, the dredge 
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